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 The E. H. Lindley Memorial Lectureship Fund was established in 1941 
in memory of Ernest H. Lindley, Chancellor of the University of Kansas 
from 1920 to 1939. In February 1941 Mr. Roy Roberts, the chairman of 
the committee in charge, suggested in the Graduate Magazine that 
the Chancellor should invite to the University for a lecture or 
a series of lectures, some outstanding national or world figure 
to speak on “Values of Living” — just as the late Chancellor 
proposed to do in his courses “The Human Situation” and “Plan 
for Living.” 
In the following June Mr. Roberts circulated a letter on behalf of the 
Committee, proposing in somewhat broader terms that 
The income from this fund should be spent in a quest of social 
betterment by bringing to the University each year outstanding 
world leaders for a lecture or series of lectures, yet with a design 
so broad in its outline that in the years to come, if it is deemed 
wise, this living memorial could take some more desirable form. 
The fund was allowed to accumulate until 1954, when Professor Richard 
McKeon lectured on “Human Rights and International Relations.” The 
next lecture was given in 1959 by Professor Everett C. Hughes, and has 
been published by the University of Kansas School of Law as part of his 
book Student’s Culture and Perspectives: Lectures on Medical and General 
Education. The selection of lectures for the Lindley series has since been 
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Our natural uncultivated ideas of morality, instead of 
providing a remedy for the partiality of our affections, 
do rather conform themselves to that partiality, and give 
it an additional force and influence. (Hume, Treatise 
3.2.2.8)
There is a spurious benevolence too often taken for the 
genuine, which proceeds from violent attachments to 
particular persons: some will do anything for those they 
fancy, but nothing for those whose faces they do not like. 
This stands but one little remove from selfishness … 
Sterling benevolence … knows no bounds besides those 
of reason. (Tucker, Light of Nature Pursued 2.334-5)
Most of us believe that impartiality has a place in morality, in sharing 
a cake between several equally deserving children, for example, or in a 
judge’s decision in a court of law. But many also hold, especially when it 
comes to benevolence,1 that reasons can arise from certain special rela-
tions in which one stands to others, relations, as Henry Sidgwick puts it, 
‘where affection normally exists, and where it ought to be cultivated, and 
where its absence is deplored if not blamed’.2
According to Sidgwick, it is quite easy to list the categories of human 
beings to whom, according to common sense, we have (partial) reasons of 
benevolence:3 our parents, spouse, children, and, to a lesser degree, our 
kin; beneficiaries and friends; neighbours and fellow citizens; those of our 
own race; and in general human beings ‘in proportion to their affinity to 
ourselves’; our country, and smaller institutions we are involved in; those 
we come into contact with.4
Those who believe that moral reasons are ultimately impartial may 
well claim that we have derivative reasons to be partial in our emotions, 
dispositions, actions, and so on.5 Utilitarians, for example, will argue that, 
given the happiness we find in partial relationships, their motivational 
effects, and the epistemic advantages in coming to know certain other 
people’s interests especially well, we have reasons to enter into and to 
sustain partial relationships.6 That these reasons are derivative is shown 
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by the fact that their grounds can be elucidated without attaching any 
special normative or evaluative weight to partial relations in themselves.7
Others, however, hold the view that there are ultimate partial 
reasons. One way to state the position is in the form of an unadorned 
basic principle:8 another’s being one’s child or friend, say, is of 
straightforward, unmediated, and ultimate moral relevance, justifying 
deviation from impartial beneficence in its own right.9 But of course it 
is also possible to provide further elucidation and defence. Consider, 
for example, Simon Keller’s sophisticated and ecumenical defence of 
partiality, which incorporates elements of Kantianism in its account 
of the value of individual persons, and of consequentialism in its 
recognition that any distribution of partial responsibilities within any 
society has to be broadly justifiable from the impartial point of view.10 
Keller insists, however, that one cannot derive specific conclusions about 
partial reasons or obligations from an impartial principle on the one hand 
and specific descriptive premises about human nature and our current 
circumstances on the other. That is partly because of imprecision, but 
also because, as we can recognize from a ‘particularist’ understanding 
of our own experience in relationships with others, there are partial 
reasons which may outweigh impartial reasons based on what is valuable 
overall.11 A father, for example, has stronger reason to fund treatment for 
his daughter’s asthma than to meet the greater needs of certain children 
unconnected with him.12 As Keller notes, this does introduce an element 
of what he calls ‘primitivism’ into his account: ‘At some point, we need 
to say that certain moral standards of partiality simply do exist’.13 And 
this brings us back to a basic principle of partiality.
Yet others offer defences of partiality which may appear to be 
derivative, but when specified turn out to be ultimate. Consider the views 
that one has ultimate reason to pursue one’s ground projects, to fulfil one’s 
commitments, or to participate in relationships one has reason to value.14 
These views, as stated, do not include any commitment to partiality: 
ground projects, commitments, and valuable relationships may be, and 
perhaps should be, entirely impartial. But current proponents of the 
views specify them with the claims that we have special and particular 
reasons to engage in certain partial ground projects, to make certain 
partial commitments, to participate in certain partial relationships.
One might distil Sidgwick’s categories into three: kin or family 
relationships; personal, social, and political relationships; and the 
relationship between beneficiary and benefactor. I shall address each 
of these in separate sections below.15 Sidgwick’s reference to racist 
partiality, as standard within the philosophy of his time as in society 
at large,16 is evidence of the point that he goes on to make: that the 
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difficulty of making partial reasons more precise is compounded by the 
great temporal and spatial variation in views of the scope and stringency 
of duties of benevolence.17 But it also poses a general challenge for any 
defence of an ultimate reason of partiality. Though views of the scope of 
benevolence have indeed varied over time, the belief that race, broadly 
construed, is a morally relevant property has been widespread until 
relatively recently. An ancient Greek would have taken it as obvious that 
a Greek should give priority to Greeks, just as most of Sidgwick’s white 
contemporaries took it as obvious that whites should give priority to 
whites. One important task for any contemporary defender of partiality is 
therefore to answer what one might call the racial analogy challenge,18 
by explaining the disanalogy between their favoured property and that 
of race, and bringing out the normative significance of the former.19 
That significance should be manifest on reflection. Imagine a case in 
which I am asked why I am offering a harmless painkiller to someone 
in agony. The fact that the painkiller will alleviate their agony stands up 
to reflection as an appropriate reason for giving it to them. The question 
is whether the relational properties used to justify partiality can survive 
the same scrutiny.
The racial analogy challenge is a problem in particular for defenders 
of ultimate reasons of partiality, since there may be a dialectical stand-
off between the racist and the proponent of partiality to, say, children or 
friends.20 Such a stand-off should be especially worrying to the defender 
of partiality when they consider that biological and cultural evolution 
have led us to be partial in some degree not only to our friends and 
family, but also to our own race.21
There are of course some obvious disanalogies between certain al-
leged grounds for partiality and race, thinly construed: certain kinds of 
shared history, for example.22 But later I shall suggest that it may be these 
properties stand up to reflection as badly as race. Part of the point of the 
racial analogy challenge is to alert us to the possibility that the properties 
we now tend to take as grounding partiality may turn out to be as irrel-
evant as race, thinly construed, has turned out to be. Some authors have 
provided a broadly ethical response to the challenge. Samuel Scheffler, for 
example, suggests that we have no reason to value relationships that are 
‘degrading’, ‘demeaning’, ‘unhealthy’, ‘exploitative’, or ‘oppressive’.23 
But these notions seem too thin on their own to distinguish between 
relationships based on mere race and those based on, say, friendship. At 
this point, the mere (non-derivative) claim that standard personal relation-
ships just are valuable is too close for comfort to the same claim about 
race, especially given that relationships of friendship and so on can be 
said to undermine human flourishing in the same way as actual racism, 
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by diverting resources to people who can derive less benefit from them 
than others.24 But note that my primary aim in what follows is to suggest 
not that the racial analogy challenge cannot be met in the case of partial 
benevolence, but merely that how it might be met is a question worthy of 
serious consideration.
1.  Kin
Sidgwick includes the duties arising from familial relationships in 
the same category as those based on race, both of them ‘arising out of 
comparatively permanent relationships not voluntarily chosen’.25 His 
criticism of alleged familial duties focuses primarily on their unclarity.26 
We think parents have a special obligation to their children, but we 
also accept that they can go too far in benefiting them or in sacrificing 
themselves for the benefit of their children. How far is too far?
Consider the following case:
My child. I am outside a burning house, and can save 
either my child or some other child. All else is equal.
Many common-sense moralists will claim that it is obvious that I 
should save my child. Sidgwick himself would probably be unimpressed 
by this common-sense view:
[S]uppose that I am thrown with my family upon a 
desert island, where I find an abandoned orphan. Is it 
evident that I am less bound to provide this child, as 
far as lies in my power, with the means of subsistence, 
than I am to provide for my own children?27
 
The common-sense moralist, however, will insist that it is quite evident 
that there is an obligation to give priority to one’s own child at least in 
some circumstances — not perhaps to provide them with superior food, 
but certainly in extremis to save them rather than the orphan.
But is it a problem that the common-sense principle advocating 
priority to one’s children in certain cases will not give precise guidance 
in all possible cases? I suggest not, since Sidgwick’s insistence that 
any acceptable moral principle must be fully action-guiding in all 
possible circumstances is based on a false analogy between standards 
in philosophical ethics and in natural science. Consider the following 
passage: 
5
[G]eneral rules and maxims may ... be found mutually 
inconsistent ... and here too conduct appears to us 
irrational, or at least imperfectly rational, not only if 
the maxims upon which it is professedly based conflict 
with and contradict one another, but also if they cannot 
be bound together and firmly concatenated by means of 
some one fundamental principle. For practical reason 
does not seem to be thoroughly realized until a perfect 
order, harmony, and unity of system is introduced into 
our actions.28
Sidgwick fails to learn from Aristotle that something analogous to 
perceptual judgement about particular cases is required for (at least, 
human) agency. Sidgwick accepts the need for such judgement at the 
level of ethical theory itself, advocating what he calls ‘philosophical 
intuitionism’, the view that ethics consists in the attempt ‘to enunciate, 
in full breadth and clearness, those primary intuitions of Reason, by the 
scientific application of which the common moral thought of mankind 
may be at once systematised and corrected’.29 But even in the case of 
a relatively straightforward theory such as hedonistic utilitarianism 
judgement will be called for in particular cases properly to assess the 
intensity and duration of the pleasures and pains which the various 
options open to one will produce, and to weigh those factors against 
each other and compare them across options.
Should we, then, accept that parents have a reason to give priority 
to their own children? What might be the ground of this reason? First, 
note that it is as hard as it is in the case of racial similarities to see how 
a mere genetic relation, even a close one, can be normatively ultimately 
relevant.30 Consider the following case:
Lost sperm. A man provides sperm for a randomized 
controlled trial. The test-tube containing the sperm is 
blown by wind from an open window into a package 
of test-tubes from sperm donors, which are then sent 
to a fertility clinic. The sperm is used to fertilize an 
egg, and a baby is later born. Several years later, the 
man finds himself outside a burning house, where he 
can save either his child or some other child. All else 
is equal.
It is difficult to believe that this man’s genetic relation to his child 
provides him with an ultimate reason to give priority to that child, whether 
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or not he is aware of the events leading to his genetic parenthood. Note 
that my argument is not meant to rest on our judgement of this case in 
particular. As we have already seen, there are different examples which 
might suggest the opposite conclusion. The point of this case, and indeed 
most of the other cases below, is heuristic: here, to enable us to see that, 
on reflection, mere biological relationships are morally irrelevant. By 
isolating them, we can see them for what they are.31
It might be claimed — by an Aristotelian perfectionist, perhaps —
that a preference for one’s own relatives over strangers is part of human 
nature and so to be acted on. But it may be that racism is also natural to 
human beings. That some action-type is characteristic of human beings 
is in itself irrelevant to whether there is a reason to engage in it.
It might be suggested also that the causal process leading to genetic 
parenthood is significantly more direct in this case than in standard 
cases (the same claim may be made against some of my other examples 
below). That is true; but degree of causal directness is, at least sometimes, 
morally irrelevant. If I kill you using some elaborate Rube Goldberg 
machine, that is as bad, other things being equal, as my stabbing you 
to death (this is not to deny that the latter may be evidence of a worse 
character). In other words, the onus here is on the objector to explain the 
moral significance of causal indirectness, at least in this case, and as yet 
no general attempt to explain such significance has won anything close 
to widespread acceptance.
The case I have been discussing involves the bringing of a new 
individual into being. Perhaps my conclusions will not carry across to 
cases of partiality involving already existing individuals. But consider:
Siblings. Sperm is donated in a fertility clinic and used 
to fertilize two donor eggs from the same woman. The 
resulting fetuses are gestated by two different women, 
and none of the parties involved ever meet. Several 
years later, one of the children finds herself outside a 
burning house, where she can save her sibling or some 
other person. All else is equal.
Again, it is hard to see why the genetic relation between these two 
individuals grounds any reason for priority.
 I accept that Lost sperm is a non-standard instance of parenthood. 
Usually, the birth of a child is a result of certain intentional, voluntary 
actions by the parents, often consisting in an attempt to produce a child 
whom they will nurture. Could such action itself provide a reason in 
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favour of priority to one’s own children?32 Sidgwick does consider such 
a view, but claims that it implies that parents have a right to diminish the 
happiness of their children to any non-negative level, even to the point 
of killing them painlessly if their life as a whole has been above the zero 
level. Children treated in this way, he suggests, could have no complaint 
against their parents, since without them they would not have existed at 
all. But this is to assume that parents owe their children only a life at or 
above the zero-level. It could be that morality requires parents to make 
their children’s lives as good as possible, or at least as good as most 
would think reasonable in the circumstances.
Consider now:
Stolen sperm. A man provides sperm for a randomized 
controlled trial. The test-tube containing the sperm is 
subsequently stolen and used in a clinic to fertilize 
an egg, and a baby is later born. The thief plans to 
kidnap and nurture the baby, but fails, and the child is 
brought up by its mother. Several years later, the thief 
finds himself outside a burning house, where he can 
save either the child he intentionally and voluntarily 
caused to exist, in the hope of nurturing it, or some 
other child. All else is equal.
The mere fact that this thief has caused a child to exist with the 
intention of nurturing it seems insufficient to ground a reason for him to 
give its interests priority over those of others. Again, however, this is an 
unusual case. Parents often love and care for their children, benefiting 
them in various ways, and that loving care is often reciprocated. This, 
along with the fact that most believe the duties of adoptive parents are no 
less stringent than those of genetic parents, suggests that alleged reasons 
to favour one’s kin may be better understood as based on personal or 
social rather than merely biological or causal relationships.33 And it 
may be that alleged reasons for children to favour their parents are also 
reasons of gratitude, at least in cases in which the lives of the children are 
above the zero level or some higher threshold. So let me consider such 
potential bases for reasons in general.
2.  Personal, Social, and Political Relationships
In a Burning House case analogous to that above, most would accept 
that the fact that one of the people one can save is one’s friend is a reason 
to give them some priority. What is that reason grounded on? One answer 
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is the non-derivative claim that friendship itself has basic normative 
relevance, or that it is a ‘role obligation’ of a friend to be partial.34
This response faces the racial analogy challenge. But one obvious 
disanalogy between racism and friendship is that the former tends not to 
involve affection, and if it does then any such affection will probably be 
below some relevant threshold. Is a defence of partial reasons based on 
affection an ultimate or a derivative defence? If the claim is that liking 
X gives one some ultimate reason to give priority to it (e.g. the fact that 
one likes this vase gives one ultimate reason to save it rather than some 
other vase), it seems structurally analogous to derivative views based on 
utility, ground projects, or commitments. But if the claim is that (partial) 
affection between friends (say) is what grounds a partial reason, it seems 
to be claiming that reasons for friendship are ultimate, the reason-giving 
property being the existence of the kind of affection characteristic of 
friendship.
It is true that a defender of affection-based partiality might have to 
admit that in very unusual cases, in which a person feels deep affection 
for those of her own race, racist partiality is justified. Further, racism can 
be based on hatred, and if affection justifies partiality in another’s favour, 
then we might expect hatred to justify partiality towards the non-hated. 
But we can anyway see that affection alone, of whatever strength, seems 
insufficient to justify partiality. Consider the following case:35
Titania. Titania wakes. The first person she sees is 
Bottom. The second person she sees is Top. Because 
of the magic juice Oberon has sprinkled in her eyes, 
she has developed a deep affection for Bottom. Both 
Bottom and Top are in a burning house, and she can 
save only one of them. All else is equal.
Titania’s affection for Bottom is a highly contingent psychological 
fact about her.36 Had she seen Top first, she would have felt the same 
affection for him instead. Now it is not the case that her new affection for 
Bottom is of no practical significance for her. Imagine, for example, that 
for some reason she has to choose to marry either Bottom or Top. She 
has a straightforward self-interested reason to marry Bottom, since that 
relationship is likely to be happier and more successful than a relationship 
with Top. The question is whether her affection for Bottom would 
provide an ultimate justification for her giving moral priority to Bottom 
over top, and it is hard to see, on reflection, why it should.37 Consider 
an analogous case, in which a judge finds herself liking one of two 
defendants much more than another. After the trial, if, for some unusual 
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reason, she has to spend a few minutes with one or other defendant, it 
might well be reasonable for her to choose to spend that time with the 
one she likes more, if we assume that neither defendant cares whether 
she chooses them or not. But if both defendants are found equally guilty, 
her greater liking for one is irrelevant to her judicial decision. What the 
Titania case shows, I suggest, is that in the domain of benevolence also 
mere affection can be placed in the same category of morally arbitrary 
and irrelevant properties as biological and causal relations. Nor does it 
matter if the affection in question is reciprocated (imagine that Oberon 
had caused Bottom to feel for Titania what she feels for him). The mere 
fact that two people feel affection for each other is not a good reason for 
either of them to give the object of their affection moral priority.
It might be objected that ordinary relations of affection are not like 
this. They are not usually brought about through manipulation, nor is 
their origin as independent of a person’s qualities. But ordinary relations 
of affection are not up to us. We just find ourselves liking or loving some 
people, and not others; so the role of Oberon in the story is not essential.38 
And we may like or love someone just because we find ourselves liking 
or loving some apparently non-evaluative feature of them: their smile, 
the sound of their laughter, the colour of their hair. But do we not, at 
least in many cases, feel affection for someone because of certain good 
or ‘loveable’ qualities they have?39 I might love my wife, for example, 
because she is beautiful, kind, and witty. But in that case why should I be 
partial to my wife, and not to those who are beautiful, kind, and witty? 
(Imagine that in the Titania case, both Bottom and Top were both equally 
well worthy of Titania’s love.) And if it is claimed that I should prioritize 
these groups, we can anyway ask why should they be given any moral 
priority, except in so far as their kindness and other beneficial qualities 
are the result of free and voluntary actions they have taken, in which case 
we are talking not about duties based on personal or social relations, but 
about duties based on moral desert.
Personal and other social relationships often involve not merely 
affection, but engagement in joint activities. Could the relevant normative 
work be done purely by the conversations and other joint activities 
characteristic of such relationships? Consider the following case:
Red and Yellow. Red and Yellow are twins. I have 
had one short, insignificant conversation with Red, 
in a cinema queue. We developed no special concern 
for one another. I have never met Yellow. I now find 
myself standing in front of a burning house, able to 
save either Red or Yellow. All else is equal.
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If we assume that the activities and conversations characteristic 
of personal and social relationships are sufficient to justify partiality, 
then we might expect there to be some — admittedly weak — reason 
for me to favour Red. But there seems to be no such reason. Here the 
partialist may appeal to long-term projects — what Bernard Williams 
calls ‘commitments’40 — that involve one person in the life of another 
over time, and with which that person will be deeply identified. Niko 
Kolodny, for example, has argued that one’s reason for loving some 
other person is the ongoing history that one shares with them, and that 
such love grounds special concern for and partiality to that person.41
Consider first the following case:
Blue and Green. Blue and I work together for many 
years, collaborating on many projects. We engage 
daily in many activities and conversations, some of 
them characteristic of friendship, and sometimes 
outside of work, in group outings. Though there is 
no spark in our relationship, we do not dislike one 
another in the slightest. We just feel no special concern 
for one another; nor do we have any commitments to 
one another, or reasons to be grateful. I have never 
met Green. I now find myself standing in front of a 
burning house, able to save either Blue or Green. All 
else is equal.
I see no reason for me to give priority to Blue over Green. But this 
case does not involve affection. So now consider:
Titania 2. Titania 2 engages daily in joint activities 
and conversations characteristic of friendship, with 
two individuals, Bottom 2 and Top 2, though she feels 
no affection for either of them. Oberon 2 sprinkles 
some magic juice into Titania 2’s eyes while she 
is asleep, which will ensure (i) that she comes to 
develops deep affection for the first person she sees 
with whom she is daily engaging in joint activities 
and conversations characteristic of friendship, and for 
whom she currently feels no special affection, and (ii) 
that Titania’s feelings will come to be reciprocated by 
this person. When Titania 2 wakes, the first person she 
sees is Bottom 2. After some time, she has to decide 
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between saving Bottom 2 and Top 2 from a burning 
house. All else is equal.
It does not seem unreasonable for Titania 2, before Oberon’s 
intervention, to have felt no affection for either Bottom 2 or Top 2, nor for 
them to have felt none for her. The cases of Titania, and Blue and Green, 
suggested respectively that neither mere affection nor a shared history can 
ground partiality. That of Titania 2 suggests that the same is true of the 
affection that often develops when people share histories. Note that this 
is not to say that such affection is unreasonable or objectionable in itself. 
What is unreasonable is believing that such affection grounds reasons to 
discriminate against those for whom one feels no such affection.
3.  Gratitude
But what about gratitude? Consider the following case:
My benefactor. I am outside a burning house, where I 
can save one of my major benefactors, or a stranger. 
All else is equal.
Many will believe that I have stronger ultimate reason to save my 
benefactor. If I have benefited from someone’s else’s actions, would it 
not be objectionably ungrateful not to give them some degree of priority 
in my practical reasoning?
Sidgwick accepts that the duty of gratitude is recognized within 
every morality, but again claims that the demands of any such duty 
are too unclear for it to be accepted as solidly based on intuition.42 As 
Sidgwick goes on to say, it is plausible to think that in standard cases 
gratitude requires some kind of ‘equal return’. But should we be requiting 
the effort made by the benefactor, or the service actually provided? 
One obvious answer is that both ought to be considered. Sidgwick 
discusses only a rather peculiar version of this view, according to which 
a beneficiary ought to consider both and then select whichever option 
requires more from them. He then turns to the purely service-based 
view, and rightly points out that we would not think that a rich person 
saved from drowning by a poor ought to give as a reward whatever she 
would have been prepared to pay in advance for her life. He concludes: 
‘Something between the two seems to suit our moral taste: but I find no 
clear accepted principle upon which the amount can be decided’. 
On reflection, it seems that gratitude should be seen entirely as a 
matter of intention on the part of the benefactor, rather than the service 
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provided. Imagine, for example, that both P and Q sought to benefit me, 
by sending me a cheque, but Q’s cheque was lost in the post.43 Though in 
fact I shall probably be more grateful to P than to Q, and be more likely 
to reciprocate and to offer more in return, this seems quite unreasonable. 
Why should Q lose out just because of an inefficient postal service?44
Should we, then, understand gratitude in terms of the ‘quality of 
will’ of a benefactor, to use P.F. Strawson’s phrase?45 To deal with the 
lost cheque case, we might think that my duty of gratitude is not to 
those who actually benefit me, but to those who attempt to benefit me. 
Consider now the following case:
Potential benefactors. I am outside a burning house, 
and can choose to save only one of the following: my 
benefactor, P; Q, who tried to benefit me and failed; 
or R, who, given the opportunity, would have tried as 
hard to benefit me as P and Q. All else is equal.
It would seem unreasonable to treat R differently from P or Q, since the 
quality of her will towards me is as good as that of P and Q. 
Now consider a further case (Potential benefactors 2), the same 
as Potential benefactors, except that I can also choose to save another 
stranger, S, who would not have benefited me, given the opportunity, but 
only because they had been given certain drugs without their knowledge. 
Without those drugs, they would, given the opportunity, have benefited 
me. Again, it would seem unreasonable to treat S differently from R, 
since her failure to be well disposed to me is not her fault. What might 
seem to matter, then, is not the mere quality of a person’s will, but the 
quality of a person’s unmanipulated will.
Consider one further case (Lack of concern), in which there is an-
other stranger, T, who would not have benefited me and who has not been 
manipulated by others. Here we have the intuition that it would not be 
unreasonable to give priority to P, Q, R, or S over T, perhaps choosing 
which of the four to benefit by lot. The quality of T’s will is less good 
than that of the others, but this is almost certainly to some practically 
relevant degree because of factors beyond T’s control. T is like she is in 
part because of her genetic predisposition to concern for others, her early 
experiences, her moral education, various events that have taken place, 
and so on. It may be that her own choices and decisions have affected her 
current character, but the fact remains that had things gone differently the 
quality of her will could have been the same as the others. For that reason 
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it seems unreasonable to discriminate against her, or indeed anyone else, 
in distributing benefits on the basis of gratitude. 
4.  Conclusion
I have sought primarily to show that it is not unreasonable to question 
whether we have ultimate partial reasons to give priority to our kin, those 
with whom we are in certain personal, social, and political relationships, 
and our beneficiaries. Since most of us feel strongly inclined to be partial, 
it is indeed, as Scheffler suggests,46 hard to imagine even this relatively 
modest view’s becoming widely accepted. But that is more a point about 
us, our nature and our evolutionary and cultural histories, than about the 
plausibility of partialism about benevolence.47
Notes
1. Since I am speaking of reasons to act rather than merely to wish 
good on others, ‘beneficence’ might be thought more apt than ‘benev-
olence’. But benevolence is usually taken to include doing good. The 
OED runs the two together in its primary definition, though the definition 
of beneficence confines it to action.
2. The Methods of Ethics (7th edn., London: Macmillan, 1907), p. 
243. Sidgwick is here describing common-sense morality, not accepting 
it, and primarily identifying the subject of his discussion (his ‘normally’ 
allows that individual relationships may be reason-giving even in the ab-
sence of affection). All references to the Methods are to this edn. unless 
stated otherwise. Note also that, though my main focus is on reasons, the 
difficulties for partiality I raise arise also for alleged duties of partiality, 
or prerogatives or permissions to be partial.
3. Methods, pp. 246-7.
4. Sidgwick adds that those in urgent need have a special claim on 
us. He is discussing benevolence in general, and this duty might plausi-
bly be characterized as impartial.
5. Cf. the distinction between reductionist and non-reductionist de-
fences of partiality in N. Kolodny, ‘Which Relationships Justify Partial-
ity? General Considerations and Problem Cases’, in B. Feltham and J. 
Cottingham (eds), Partiality and Impartiality: Morality, Special Rela-
tionships, and the Wider World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, 
169-93), pp. 170-77.
6. Methods, pp. 432-6.
7. Some utilitarians have held that personal relationships themselves 
are constituents of well-being; see e.g. D. Brink, Moral Realism and the 
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Foundations of Ethics  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 
pp. 233-4. This defence of partiality is perhaps best classified as a view 
that, though it may appear ultimately impartial, turns out to be partial 
when specified; see main text below. Since I am concerned with benevo-
lence as a source of moral reasons, I see as derivative the view that there 
is a self-interested reason to be partial because it promotes one’s own 
good. Such a view may perhaps be found in E. Lord’s recent defence 
of partiality: ‘In order for creatures like us to fully thrive, we must par-
ticipate in partial relationships with things that are valuable’ (‘Justify-
ing Partiality’, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (2016: 569-90), 
p. 584).
8. For a brief discussion of such positions, see S. Keller, Partiality 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), pp. 9-11.
9. See e.g. W.D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1930), p. 19; T. Jollimore, Friendship and Agent-relative Moral-
ity (New York: Garland, 2001), pp. 9-10, 162-3; for criticism, see R. 
Arneson, Consequentialism vs. Special-ties Partiality’, Monist 86 (2003: 
382-401), pp. 395-6.
10. Partiality, pp. 92-7, 101-8.
11. Partiality, pp. 98-101, 104-5.
12. Partiality, pp. 110-11.
13. Partiality, p. 111; see p. 114.
14. See e.g. S. Stroud, ‘Permissible Projects, Partiality, and Plural 
Agency’, in Feltham and Cottingham (eds), Partiality and Impartial-
ity: Morality, Special Relationships, and the Wider World (131-49); D. 
Jeske, Rationality and Moral Theory: How Intimacy Generates Reasons 
(New York: Routledge, 2008), ch. 4; S. Scheffler, Boundaries and Al-
legiances: Problems of Justice and Responsibility in Liberal Thought 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), ch. 6. 
15. My discussion of the second category will focus in particular 
on love and friendship, on the assumption that doubts about these will 
extend to more distant relationships, such as those of neighbours or fel-
low citizens.
16. See e.g. A. Barratt, ‘The “Suppression” of Egoism’, Mind 2 
(1877: 167-18), p. 185: ‘Besides his relation to nature which constitutes 
him an individual and gives content to his simplest Egoism, [man] is a 
member of a family, a profession, a social circle, a race, a country, and 
finally of an ideal society within his breast’. Race is mentioned by Schef-
fler as a currently accepted ground for a claim to at least certain forms of 
partiality (Boundaries and Allegiances, p. 64).
17. Noting how Sidgwick held out against ‘the overwhelming tide 
of neo-Darwinian racism’, B. Schultz speaks also of the ‘breathtaking 
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fatuity with which Sidgwick designates unfamiliar peoples “lower” or 
“semi-civilised” or “savage”, with perfect insouciance consigning their 
ways of life to extinction’ (Henry Sidgwick: Eye of the Universe (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 639-40). 
18. See e.g. J. Cottingham, ‘Partiality, Favouritism and Morality’, 
Philosophical Quarterly 36 (1986: 357-73), p. 359; J. Rachels, ‘Morality, 
Parents, and Children’, repr. in Can Ethics Provide Answers? (Lanham: 
Rowman and Littlefield, 1997, 231-33), p. 216; C. Wellman, ‘Relational 
Facts in Liberal Political Theory: Is there Magic in the Pronoun “My”?’, 
Ethics 110 (2000: 537-62), pp. 552-3; Kolodny, ‘Which Relationships 
Justify Partiality? General Considerations and Problem Cases’, p. 170.
19. I am understanding ‘racism’ here in a thin and ahistorical way, 
as merely the view that an agent always has a non-derivative reason to 
give some moral priority to members of her own race, the intended im-
plication of the challenge being that this property is often as irrelevant 
as, say, the fact that someone was born on a Thursday. Racism so con-
strued is consistent, for example, with valuing to some degree members 
of other races or their ways of life (cf. T. Jollimore, ‘Friendship without 
Partiality?’, Ratio 13 (2000: 69-82), p.81). In his ‘Egoism’ (printed as 
an appendix to S. Rachels and T. Alter, ‘Nothing Matters in Survival’, 
Journal of Ethics 9 (2005, 311-30)), J. Rachels argues that the preference 
for oneself over others is analogous to racism of the kind I have in mind. 
I leave aside also forms of racism according to which all ought to give 
some priority to one particular race or sub-set of races.
20. Utilitarians do have to deal with the objection that they may re-
quire racism in practice. But they do not have to defend any disanalogy 
between racism and other partial relations; for them, all such relations 
are, if important, only derivatively so.
21. On the implications of human evolution for our view of partial-
ity, see the discussion of P. Singer and K. Lazari-Radek’s paper ‘The 
Objectivity of Ethics and the Unity of Practical Reason’ on the PEASoup 
blog: http://peasoup.typepad.com/peasoup/2012/12/ethics-discussions-
at-pea-soup-katarzyna-de-lazari-radek-and-peter-singer-the-objectivity-
of-ethics-1.html On racism, see e.g. M.P. Burns and J.A. Sommerville, 
‘“I Pick You”: The Impact of Fairness and Race on Infants’ Selection of 
Social Partners’, Frontiers of Psychology 12 February 2014, https://doi.
org/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00093.
22. See e.g. Kolodny, ‘Which Relationships Justify Partiality? Gen-
eral Considerations and Problem Cases’, p. 189
23. Boundaries, p. 107; note also his ‘Projects, Relationships, and 
Reasons’, in R.J. Wallace, P. Pettit, S. Scheffler, and M. Smith (eds), 
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Reason and Value: Themes from the Philosophy of Joseph Raz (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2004, 246-69), p. 258, n. 10.
24. See Scheffler, Boundaries, pp. 58, 107. Impartial views such as 
utilitarianism have long been criticized for their lack of realism: human 
beings, it is said, are just not capable of pure impartiality. That may well 
be true, but it is also the case that they are capable of significantly greater 
impartiality. Consider Christmas. Deloitte (https://dupress.deloitte.com/
dup-us-en/industry/retail-distribution/holiday-retail-sales-consumer-
survey.html?id=us:2em:3na:holiday:dup3524:awa:cip:102616) estimate 
that in 2016 US citizens spent $1 trillion during the Christmas period, 
much of which will have been on gifts for family, friends, and colleagues. 
If we accept Jeffrey Sachs’s claim that to end extreme world poverty 
in twenty years would cost around $175 billion p.a. (The End of Pov-
erty: How We Can Make it Happen in our Lifetime (New York: Penguin, 
2005)), then it seems that Americans would need to channel less than 
one fifth of their current Christmas spending into overseas development 
to bring to an end within two decades the terrible injustice and suffering 
caused by extreme world poverty. Arguments for partiality often appeal 
to its benefits (see e.g. Scheffler, Boundaries, p. 63); but in its present 
form its costs, like those of racism and other widely criticized forms 
of partiality, are enormous. As I have noted, impartialists justify some 
forms of partiality derivatively with reference to their benefits. Given 
both the benefits of partiality, and the costs of the extreme partiality now 
practised across the world, the practical implications of a philosophically 
impartialist view and of a plausible philosophically partialist view are 
likely to be much closer than philosophical defenders of partiality tend 
to suggest.
25. Methods, p. 248. Sidgwick includes his discussion of parental 
duties to children under this heading, perhaps because, unlike those of 
friendship, such relationships are not voluntarily chosen relationships 
with already existing individuals. He does not go on to discuss race fur-
ther, claiming that ‘it would be tedious to go in detail through all the 
degrees of consanguinity’, and that the more remote the degree, the more 
vague the alleged duty.
26. Methods, pp. 248-54; 345-9.
27. Methods, pp. 346-7.
28. Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics (1st edn., London: Macmillan, 
1874), pp. 25-6.
29. Methods, pp. 373-4.
30. See e.g. D. Archard, ‘What’s Blood Got to Do with It? The Sig-
nificance of Natural Parenthood’, Res Publica 1 (1995: 91-106); M. Aus-
tin, ‘The Failure of Biological Accounts of Parenthood’, Journal of Value 
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Inquiry 38 (2004: 499-51), pp. 499-500; N. Kolodny, ‘Which Relation-
ships Justify Partiality? The Case of Parents and Childen’, Philosophy 
and Public Affairs 38 (2010: 37-75); T. Rulli, ‘Preferring a Genetically 
Related Child’, Journal of Moral Philosophy 6 (2016: 669-98), p. 692. 
As always, it is important to ask a proponent of the normative signifi-
cance of the genetic relation whether it grounds an ultimate or merely 
derivative reason. Kolodny (pp. 70-73) provides a suggestive argument 
for ultimate significance based on an analogy with egoistic concern. 
The argument is of course double-edged: the case below suggests that 
any attempt to base the rationality of egoistic concern on a diachronic 
genetic relationship will itself fail. D. Brink’s arguments for partiality 
based on analogies with the rationality of self-interest are also double-
edged in this way; see ‘Rational Egoism, Self, and Others’, in O. Flana-
gan and A. Rorty (eds), Identity, Character, and Morality (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 1990, 339-78), pp. 339-78; ‘Self-love and Altruism’, 
Social Philosophy and Policy 14 (1997: 127-57), pp 138-41; ‘Rational 
Egoism and the Separateness of Persons’, in J. Dancy (ed.), Reading 
Parfit (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997, 96-134), pp. 126-8; ‘Impartiality and 
Associative Duties’, Utilitas 13 (2001, 152-72), pp. 166-9. For a helpful 
account of the social bases of belief in the significance of genetic ties, 
see S. Haslanger, ‘Family, Ancestry and Self: What is the Moral Sig-
nificance of Biological Ties?’, DSpace@MIT (2009), https://dspace.mit.
edu/handle/1721.1/64650.
31. It might be claimed that the some of the various factors I isolate 
may be morally relevant when brought together in a single case. They 
may be, but some argument would be required to show how two morally 
irrelevant properties could combine to become morally relevant. Note 
also that the unusual nature of the cases helps avoid our assessment of 
them being distorted by common-sense intuitions concerning partiality 
of the very kind we are seeking to hold up to the light (e.g. our view that 
a long-lost child who knocks on our door asking to meet us should not 
be treated like a mere stranger).
32. See e.g. O. O’Neill, ‘Begetting, Bearing, and Rearing’, in O. 
O’Neill and W. Ruddick (eds), Having Children: Philosophical and Le-
gal Reflections on Parenthood (New York: Oxford University Press, 25-
38); D. Archard, ‘The Obligations and Responsibilities of Parenthood’, 
in D. Archard and D. Benatar (eds), Procreation and Parenthood: The 
Ethics of Rearing Children (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010, 
103-27), pp. 100-11; L. Porter, ‘Why and How to Prefer a Causal Ac-
count of Parenthood’, Journal of Social Philosophy 45 (2014: 182-202), 
pp. 191-8; S. Olsaretti, ‘Liberal Equality and the Moral Status of Parent-
Child Relationships’, in D. Sobel, P. Vallentyne, and S. Wall (eds), Ox-
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ford Studies in Political Philosophy, vol. 3 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2017, 58-83); L. Ferracioli, ‘Procreative-parenting, Love’s Rea-
sons and the Demands of Morality’, Philosophical Quarterly 68 (2018, 
77-97).
33. See e.g. D.Jeske, ‘Families, Friends, and Special Obligations’, 
Canadian Journal of Philosophy 28 (1998, 527-56). I take the merely 
biological aspects of the gestational relationship to be open to counter-
examples similar to those in this section. The concern felt by a gesta-
tional parent I am assuming to be analogous to the social relationships 
discussed in the following section. For a helpful discussion of the dis-
tinction between genetic and gestational parenting, see A. Gheaus, ‘Bio-
logical Parenthood: Gestational not Genetic’, Australasian Journal of 
Philosophy 96 (2018: 225-40).
34. See M.O. Hardimon, ‘Role Obligations’, Journal of Philosophy 
(1994: 333-63), p. 336.
35. For a similar case, see that of ‘Fred Simmons’, in N. Kolodny, 
‘Love as Valuing a Relationship’, Philosophical Review 112 (2003, 135-
89), pp. 144-5.
36. Contingency itself is not objectionable, of course. My promise 
to you may be a contingent matter. But that — if there is an ultimate duty 
to keep promises — makes my duty to you to fulfil that promise ground-
ed and non-arbitrary in a way that Titania’s alleged partial reason is not.
37. It may be suggested by a defender of a broadly ‘internalist’ view 
of reasons that Titania’s concern for Bottom grounds a reason of partial-
ity (see B. Williams, ‘Internal and External Reasons’, repr. in his Moral 
Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 101-13). It is un-
clear how such a version of internalism can answer the racial analogy 
challenge.
38. Some might claim that what happens to Titania is especially 
objectionable since her will is dominated by another person. A version 
of the story could then be told in which the juice happens to drip as sap 
from an overhanging branch.
39. For a good defence of this view as applied to romantic love, see 
S. Keller, ‘How do I Love Thee? Let me Count the Properties’, Ameri-
can Philosophical Quarterly 37 (2000: 163-73); For a helpful critical 
account of the view in general, see Kolodny, ‘Love as Valuing a Rela-
tionship’, pp. 138-42. The role of attachment to what is impersonally 
valuable in creating meaning is elucidated in J. Raz, Value, Respect, and 
Attachment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 19. 
40. ‘A Critique of Utilitarianism’, in J. Smart and B. Williams, Utili-
tarianism: For and Against (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1973, 77-150), pp. 113, 116; ‘Persons, Character, and Morality’, repr. in 
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Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981, 1-19), pp. 
12, 14, 16. See S. Wolf, ‘Morality and Partiality’, Philosophical Per-
spectives 6 (1992:): 243-259.
41. Kolodny, ‘Love as Valuing a Relationship’, pp. 135-6, 162-3; 
Which Relationships Justify Partiality? General Considerations and 
Problem Cases’, pp. 182-4. See also Brink, ‘Self-love and Altruism’, p. 
143; ‘Eudaimonism, Love and Friendship, and Politicial Community’, 
Social Philosophy and Policy 16 (1999, 253-89), pp. 266, 270; ‘Impar-
tiality and Associative Duties’, Utilitas  13 (2001, 152-72), pp. 159-64; 
N. Delaney, ‘Romantic Love and Loving Commitment: Articulating a 
Modern Ideal, American Philosophical Quarterly 33 (1996: 375-405), 
p. 96.
42. Methods, pp. 259-61.
43. The case is adapted from P. Abelard, Ethics, in Peter Abelard’s 
Ethics, ed. D. Luscombe (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 48.13-30.
44. My argument against gratitude in this section is analogous in cer-
tain ways to what Scheffler calls ‘the distributive objection’ to the claim 
that we have certain special responsibilities to others (see e.g. Boundar-
ies, pp. 83-6). But my suggestion is not that priority based on gratitude is 
unfair, since this is consistent with there being a pro tanto reason to give 
such priority, but that the notion of gratitude is internally undermining 
to the point of practical irrelevance. I am relying on a broader version 
of  what Adam Smith calls the ‘equitable maxim’, according to which 
blameworthiness and praiseworthiness depend on a person’s intentions, 
not on irrelevant factors over which they have no control (see The Theo-
ry of the Moral Sentiments, ed. D.Raphael and A. Macfie (Indianapolis: 
Liberty Fund, 1982), II.iii.intro.1-5). The maxim I have in mind applies 
to rewards other than praise, and is a matter not of equity or justice, but 
of reasonableness. It seems plain unreasonable to give someone priority 
over another merely because, by accident, she has succeeded in benefit-
ing one. Here we see the same arbitrariness and contingency as in the 
Titania cases above. (The problem for partiality of differential luck is 
well stated by Rachels, ‘Morality, Parents, and Children’, pp. 214-16.)
45. ‘Freedom and Resentment’, repr. in Gary Watson (ed.), Free Will 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd edn., 2003, 72-93), p. 83.
46. Boundaries, p. 42.
47. This Lindley Lecture was delivered at the University of Kan-
sas in April 2018. I am most grateful to the Dept. of Philosophy for the 
invitation, and to the audience at the lecture for very helpful comments 
and discussion. I wish to thank also audiences at the Australian Catho-
lic University, the Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität (Munich), the Uni-
versidade Federal de Santa Catarina (Florianopolis), the University of 
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Salzburg, the University of London, Tel-Hai College, and the Hebrew 
University of Jerusalem; and the following for many valuable insights: 
Ralf Bader, Nigel Bowles, David Brink, Tony Coady, Dale Dorsey, Tom 
Douglas, Linda Eggert, Ben Eggleston, Amanda Greene, Bashshar Hay-
dar, David Heyd, Brad Hooker, Joe Horton, Simon Keller, Ben Lange, 
Eli Pitcovski, Jonathan Pugh, Theron Pummer, Richard Rowland, Shlo-
mi Segall, Margaret Shea, Christian Seidel, John Skorupski, and Preston 
Werner.
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